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3 The Impact of Petroleum Exports on 
the Saudi Arabian Economy 
Robert E. Looney 
Introduction 
Fluctuations in petroleum exports dominate the activity of most of the 
major economic variables in a petroleum-based economy .1 In Saudi Arabia's 
case, the quadrupling of crude oil prices in late 1973 led to a rapid improve-
ment in the country's terms of trade. This resulted in an immediate increase in 
the proportion of oil receipts in national income, in the balance of payments 
receipts, and in the fiscal budget. The short-run effect of these developments 
was the rapid improvement in all segments of the economy. 2 
The series of shock waves that resulted from the crude oil price rise was 
transmitted into the system through the huge increase in public spending and in 
imports. The full impact of these developments may not have been completely 
felt yet. In fact, many of the trends set in motion in the mid-1970s were 
reinforced with oil price increases in 197 8-79. 
Keeping in mind that Saudi Arabia has not felt the full impact of oil 
revenues on the economy, this paper will examine the impact of the petroleum 
industry on the Saudi Arabian economy between 1960 and 1978. Particular 
attention is focused on: (1) the manner in which the country's oil exports can be 
viewed as an engine of growth (or leading sector) during this period, and 
(2) a determination of the overall impact of the 1973-74 export stimulation on 
the economy. • 
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The Oil Sector 
As shown in Table 3 .1, Saudi Arabia's oil sector dominates the economy in 
terms of: (1) gross domestic product (where it has consistently accounted for 
over half of GDP); (2) government revenues (where it consistently finances 
well over 90 percent of the government's expenditures); and (3) exports (for 
all practical purposes the kingdom has no non-oil exports). 
Until the last several years, these patterns were reinforced by the post-1973 
oil boom. It is significant in this regard that the 1974 income ($22.6 billion) 
was greater than the sum of all previous annual revenues ($19 .2 billion). 
Production for export results from complex policy decisions that involve 
technical, domestic, and international factors. A convenient approximation of 
changes in supply over time is the relationship between the extraction rate and 
the number of years of crude supply corresi}onding to this extraction rate. 
Production increases or declines with rises or declines in the reserve produc-
tion ratio. This relationship is therefore a first approximation in determining 
the normal extraction rate. 3 
In practice, the normal extraction rate has been modified by two major 
factors, the absorptive capacity of the economy and the kingdom's preference 
for moderate price increases over time. Given the government's prime objec-
tive of recycling as much revenue as possible within the economy, an ongoing 
effort has been made to increase the economy's absorptive capabilities. How-
ever, with the inflationary pressures resulting from massive increases in 
investment, the government has on occasion reduced the rate of increase in its 
domestic expenditures. If, during these stabilization periods, the financial 
reserves become too large compared to the gross national product, the absorp-
tion multiple may decrease below one and crude oil production may be 
reduced. (Absorption multiple measures the responsiveness of domestic ex-
penditures to changes in oil revenues. Thus, a multiple less than one reflects a 
situation in which a one-dollar increase in oil revenues is associated with an 
increase of less than one dollar in domestic [government plus private] con-
sumption and investment expenditures.) 
Pricing policy is the second factor affecting the supply of Saudi Arabian oil. 
Since the escalation of the price of crude oil, Saudi Arabia has become of 
critical significance in OPEC and the world oil market because of its power to 
affect petroleum prices. This relates to its ability and willingness to produce at 
a rate far higher than its development requirements. Recent OPEC meetings 
held since those in Doha in 1975 have unquestionably confirmed this fact. 
Consequently, the current price of oil is related to the rate at which the Saudi 
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Petroleum exports affect the economy both directly and indirectly. The 
retained value of oil exports reflects the direct link to the economy. It is equal 
to the value of oil exports minus net factor payments abroad (which consist of 
ARAMCO's shares in profits and the company's imports of material and 
equipment). 4 The retained value of oil exports is divided into two parts: (1) oil 
taxes, royalties, and other fees, which are paid to the host governments in 
foreign currencies (mostly U.S. dollars); and (2) payments to the employed 
factors of production, which consist mainly of wages and salaries, as well as 
for the value of goods and services purchased domestically by the operating oil 
companies. s 
Although the oil industry is well insulated from the rest of the economy, it 
has all the characteristics to play the role of a leading sector. Its productivity is 
much higher than other sectors of the economy, and until the last several years 
its share in gross domestic product was increasing steadily. Clearly, oil 
exports have the potential ofleading to growth in other sectors, along with a 
continuous rise in domestic per capita income, which would be determined by 
the composition of oil-financed expenditures. 
Impact of Petroleum Exports 
The manner in which exports act as a leading sector and the effect of exports 
on national economies have been discussed in the literature for some time. The 
consensus among economists is that exports can contribute to economic 
growth through their direct contribution to gross domestic product. This is 
because they are included as part of GDP, and indirectly through linkages 
created with non-oil sectors in a sequence of multiplier-accelerator mecha-
nisms. (Multiplier-accelerator mechanisms refer to the impact of expendi-
tures on the overall level of income of the country-Le., government 
expenditures increase income, which in tum stimulate higher levels of invest-
ment. This leads to a larger increase in income than would have occurred in 
the absence of the private sector's responsiveness [investment] to increased 
sales.) Theoretically, these indirect contributions to the economy can operate 
long after a particular change in exports has occurred. 
In sum, the overall impact of a change in exports will depend on: (1) result-
ing changes in technology, (2) the propensity to import, (3) the extent to which 
investment opportunities are generated, (4) the ability to attract foreign 
investment, and (5) other nonquantitative effects. Since at least five somewhat 
unrelated factors determine the overall impact of exports on the economy, 
there is no reason to believe that the multiplier as measured here will remain 
constant in future time periods. Clearly, if the opportunities generated by the 
growth of the export sector are exploited, this will result in a pattern of 
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economic growth, characterized as a process of diversification about an ex-
port base. 
More formally, there are several ways the oil industry can promote broadly 
based development in the country (or at least provide the means for such 
development if appropriate domestic policies are followed): 6 
1. direct payments to the productive factors that provide a source of 
noninflationary demand for domestic output , 
2. purchases of domestic goods and nonwage services to stimulate 
domestic output 
· 3. payments to government to be used directly or indirectly for capital 
investment or for social programs in education and health that con-
stitute productive investment in human resources 
4. the promotion of investment through sale of petroleum products to 
other domestic industries, and purchases of goods and services by the 
petroleum sector from domestic firms (forward and backward link-
ages, respectively) 
5. a supply of foreign exchange, so that the country is not faced with a 
short-term foreign exchange constraint on its development program 
and can thereby achieve a more rapid increase in investment 
Most studies of the impact of primary products on the indigenous econo-
mies of developing countries have largely been documentations of the direct 
effects of the sector (items 1, 2, 3, and 5 above).7 These studies have involved 
the government's retained earnings from export of the primary product, as 
well as the direct contribution of the sector to exports, government finances, 
employment, and so on. Though valuable, these studies are always somewhat 
unsatisfactory, since they merely confirm the sector's contribution to govern-
ment revenues and foreign exchange earnings. Most studies ignore the other 
direct effects or linkages. These studies usually conclude that the oil sector is 
not a leading sector in the true historical sense, unlike many of the dynamic 
sectors of the past, such as Canadian wheat, Swedish timber, British textiles, 
and American railroads. If true, the implications of these results are some-
what unclear. 
From a policy perspective, a more productive approach would be one that 
acknowledges the isolation of the oil industry from other sectors of the 
economy. Such an approach should recognize that by inducing private sector 
investment and an efficient pattern of government investment, the oil sector 
could still have an overall impact on the economy, similar in many regards to 
classic export-based leading sectors. The petroleum sector does not partici-
pate directly in the buying and selling of goods in the domestic Saudi market, 
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as have the leading export growth sectors. However, much the same effect 
may result from increases in petroleum revenues and the demand responses 
they produce as they interact with the rest of the economy. 
In short, there is no a priori reason why the petroleum sector could not act 
as a leading sector in providing an engine of growth. The issue is ultimately an 
empirical one that can only be resolved through regression-based impact 
analysis. 
The sections that follow examine whether (from a statistical standpoint) the 
demand-increasing effect of the continued growth of petroleum exports 
from Saudi Arabia has induced a steady expansion in the country's indige-
nous income. 
Pattern of Development 
. 
The proceeds from oil exports increased markedly from 1965 to 1975, and 
especially sharply after the oil embargo in 1973 (Table 3.1), with accompany-
ing huge rises in oil prices. The substantial increases in the value of oil exports 
had a noticeable effect on the performance of the economy. All of the major 
macroeconomic indicators increased rapidly. Real government investment 
averaged a 59 .4 percent annual rate of increase over the 1973-1978 period and 
102.8 percent between 1975 and 1978. 
Real non-oil GDP increased at 15.2 and 14.5 percent per annum for the 
1973-1978and1975-1978 subperiods, respectively. Real imports, however, 
expanded at 45.6 and 40.0 percent per annum, respectively, during the same 
period. One of the striking patterns during the 1970s is the fall in the 
percentage of GDP contributing to consumption and the expansion of invest-
ment as a proportion of GDP. 
The only structural changes in the sectoral composition of output, how-
ever, included a decline in the relative contribution of agriculture and a rise 
(1973, 1975) and then decline (1979) in the share of crude petroleum (Table 
3.2). (The sectoral composition of output refers to the components of gross 
domestic product, such as agriculture and industrial services.) Construction 
and the wholesale retail trade were the only sectors to show sustained in-
creases in their share of GDP. 
These patterns of development differ somewhat from those of the older 
industrialized countries, where historically the shift has been from the pri-
mary to the secondary and then to the tertiary sectors of the economy. (The 
primary activities include agriculture, mining, and crude oil and gas produc-
tion; secondary activities include industry, construction, water, and power; 
and tertiary activities include banking, insurance, and other private and public 
services.) The pattern observed in Saudi Arabia also suggests the country is 
increasingly reliant on its only asset (oil) to provide increases in gross 
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Table3.2 
SAUDI ARABIA: SECTORAL COMPOSmON OF OUTPUT, 1967-1979 
(constant 1970 prices) 
Sector 1967 1970 1973 1975 1979 
Agriculture 6.5 5.7 4.0 3.7 3.2 
Crude petroleum and natural gas 45.5 46.6 56.6 54.6 45.4 
Mining 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 
Manufacturing 
Petroleum refining 5.8 7.1 5.0 4.1 3.7 
Other 2.3 2.5 2.2 2.3 2.8 
Electricity, gas, water 1.5 1.6 1.4 1.0 1.6 
Construction 6.2 5.4 5.1 7.8 11.1 
Wholesale, retail trade 5.6 5.8 5.0 6.0 9.4 
Transportation, communication 6.8 7.1 6.7 4.1 6.1 
Finance, services 6.0 5.8 4.4 7.0 8.3 
Social and personal services 1.3 1.4 1.0 1.0 1.2 
Government services 10.9 9.6 7.2 7.7 6.8 
Other 1.3 1.1 1.1 0.4 0.1 
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
SOURCE: Ministry of Finance and National Economy, Central Department of Statistics, National 
Accounts of Saudi Arabia, 1967, 1975, 1981. 
domestic product, with no significant signs of diversification. The data indi-
cate that the manufacturing sector is actually declining in relative terms. 
Sectoral contributions to employment show one basic change: a reduction 
of the labor force in the agricultural sector, accompanied by an increase in the 
labor force in the service sector. 8 This does not, however, necessarily reflect 
the same sort of structural change that resulted from the development process 
in the developed countries. In Saudi Arabia's case, there have been no 
significant increases in the Saudi labor force of the secondary sectors. Also 
there is no evidence that the expansion of the labor force in the service sector 
was in response to increasing productivity in the secondary or tertiary sectors. 
Actually, it has been suggested that the service sector has acted merely as a 
residual for employment-that is, a sector capable of absorbing workers 
unable to find jobs in agriculture or industry. 9 As such, its expanded employ-
ment should not be viewed as an indication of development. 
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On face value, the statistics show that despite the reduction of employment 
in the agricultural sector of the Saudi economy, this is still the largest 
employment sector. The economy appears to be increasingly reliant on oil. 
More troublesome, perhaps, is the fact that there are no real signs of diversifi-
cation about an export base. 
Although the relationship between the growth of oil exports and the growth 
of GDP over time is central to an export base model of growth, the literature 
has never been specific about the operational nature of this relationship-Le., 
exactly what effect the time pattern changes in exports should have on income. 
The problem of determining the time lag between oil export growth and 
economic growth in Saudi Arabia must therefore be central to any econo-
metric investigation regarding the export base. 
Mechanisms of Oil-Based Growth 
Given Saudi Arabia's low level of development after 1973, if oil revenues 
were completely utilized through government expenditures, growth in output 
and employment in the nonpetroleum sector would be largely a function of the 
trend in petroleum exports. In this situation, a Keynesian multiplier model 
would provide a fairly accurate depiction of the impact of oil revenues on the 
non-oil sectors of the domestic economy. 
If the link between oil production, exports, revenues, and government ex-
penditures is as precise as that outlined above, the economy might be conve-







where EXP=total value of oil revenues; NOY=non-oil gross domestic prod-
uct; Z=total imports; S=total savings; z=the marginal propensity to import; 
and s=the marginal propensity to save. 
In this depiction of the economy, government spending is totally induced by 
oil export receipts. Similarly, income generated in the non-oil sector is wholly 
induced by oil export expansion. The value of the oil export multiplier is 
determined by the reciprocal of (z+s). Given these assumptions, income 
induced by the oil boom will continue to rise until the leakages (imports and 
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savings) become equal to the initial increase in public spending. If government 
expenditures continue to rise from the steady expansion in oil export receipts, 
income generated in the non-oil sector should also continue to grow. 
Preliminary regressions of oil revenues and exports on sectoral output and 
macroeconomic expenditures indicate that the value of the oil revenue coeffi-
cient (and exports) is very small (see Tables 3.3-3.10). This indicates that the 
direct effects between oil revenues and the economy are not very high. The 
lack of any real correlation between current revenues and these variables may, 
however, give a biased picture of the impact of oil revenues on the economy. 
For one thing, several of the more important ministries in Riyadh were 
incapable of adjusting their budgets to the rapidly rising revenues after 1973, 
thus producing a growing government surplus. Actual spending has also 
fluctuated from year to year and has not systematically followed fluctuations 
of actual expenditures from actual revenues (particularly reduced real oil 
revenues). These fluctuations were partially responsible for the small degree 
of association between expenditure (or sectoral output) and exports.11 
Though the Keynesian model outlined above provides insights into the 
dynamics of Saudi Arabia's growth process, it is only a rough approximation 
of the forces at work. The links between oil exports, revenues, and govern-
ment expenditures are not precise, nor have oil revenues risen steadily 
over time. 
Alternative Estimation Procedures 
Fortunately, econometric estimation makes possible a number of pro-
cedures that facilitate a direct determination of the impact of oil revenues over 
time. 12 Thus, one is not confined to a standard linear regression model that 
specifies a causal relationship between the dependent and independent vari-
ables. Use of that model implies that a unit change of one of the independent 
variables causes a change in the dependent variable only during that particular 
time period. Clearly, this type of specification is too restrictive for examining 
the impact of the oil industry on the Saudi Arabian economy. For example, oil 
revenues accrued and spent by the government may influence investment in 
various sectors of the economy over certain periods, exerting some influence 
today, some next year, some the year after that, and so on. Such a causal 
spread over a period of time is often discussed in terms of distributed Iags. 13 
The linear regression estimation procedure may be tailored to incorporate 
such effects. 
For example, it can be demonstrated that an equation of the Koyck form: 14 
y=ax+byL+z (a) 
implies an exponential decay scheme whereby the effect of a permanent 
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increase in government revenues (ax) would influence government expendi-
tures not only during that period, but would also have (in declining terms) an 
impact on their level in future years. It can be shown that this result stems 
directly from the inclusion of national income lagged one year (byL) on the 
right-hand side of the equation. 15 
Saudi Arabia exhibits impact patterns along these lines, since oil-supported 
government expenditures (such as consumption) are especially heavy during 
the first few time periods, decaying gradually thereafter. Patterns of this type 
may modify equation (a), above. 
Though this is a distinct improvement over the one-period (year) impact 
formulation, this specification may be too restrictive in analyzing the impact 
on the economy of both the oil sector and government expenditures. In 
actuality, delays in planning, implementing, and so on may mean that oil 
exports will have no appreciable effect on national income or sectoral output 
for some time. In this situation, the initial impact·on the economy is at a 
maximum, exhibiting a gradual decaying pattern over time. This pattern 
would most likely occur in areas of new investment. Given the low base from 
which the economy began expanding in 1960, the distributed lag would be 
negligible until the plant was completed. Thereafter, its effect on production 
would likely make a significant increase in overall production for some time. 
This type of situation can be approximated by adding another lagged term 
for the oil (or expenditure) variable, as in 
y=ax+byL+cxL+ z (b) 
thus postponing the starting point for the exponential decay for one time 
period (year). By including further lagged values of the independent variable, 
x, or oil exports, expenditures, and so on, the starting point of the exponential 
decay could be shifted to any value (year) in the future. 
Finally, if the oil impact equation had been estimated as 
y=byL+cxL+z (c) 
a special case of equation (b) occurs, where exponential decay would begin 
only after a further delay. 
In short, formulations with one lagged dependent (impact) variable are 
capable of generating a variety of oil-related distributed lag schemes that can 
be easily estimated using standard econometric techniques. All these schemes 
are similar in that they exhibit exponential decay over some time range. More 
importantly, given Saudi Arabia's narrow development base, these formula-
tions have the added advantage of generating impacts that make a priori 
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sense-that is, time profiles beginning with an outburst followed by a grad-
ual decay. _ 
Though the above formulations (equations a, b, c) are clearly significant 
improvements over the one-period impact formulation, government expendi-
ture impacts can occur gradually, peak after several years, and then de-
cay. Such a scheme can be estimated by lagging the impact variable more 
than once: 
y=byL+cxL+dyL2+z. (d) 
The time profile of the impact generated by oil-related effects through this 
formulation are determined by the two parameters, c and d. That is, a change 
in the values of c and d will affect the shape of the resulting unimodal time 
profile curve. As noted, all curves of this type have the property of gradually 
increasing their decaying after a peak year impact has been reached. 
Each of the four basic formulations (a, b, c, d) above makes logical sense. 
Since none is superior in identifying a particular oil-related impact on the 
economy, all four were estimated. 
Before the impact estimates were made, however, patterns of oil receipts, 
expenditures, and sectoral growth were examined to see if the 1973-74 oil 
price increases caused a fundamental structural break in past economic pat-
terns, significantly modifying the economy's absorptive capacity. 
Absorptive Capacity of the Economy 
Absorptive capacity is an important factor in determining the impact of oil 
revenues on the economy. It facilitates estimates of the optimal rate of 
investment, as well as identifying the role of capital in expanding the produc-
tive capacity of the economy. 16 In Saudi Arabia's case, emphasis should be 
placed on the relationship between capital accumulation and capital forma-
tion. This concept challenges the notion that Arabia's economic growth is 
principally constrained by capital shortage to one more realistic for the 
post-1973 period. That is, the economy is likely to encounter a number of 
constraints in productively utilizing a substantially higher volume of capital. 
Using this approach, absorptive capacity can be defined in terms of the 
optimal adjustment of the growth rates of all factors of production. Stress here 
is given to the importance of adjusting factor proportions to the new conditions 
produced by the oil boom. In this environment, labor, managerial skills, and 
other noncapital factors of production have been the binding constraints on 
real economic expansion. The country's main economic problems are best 
perceived in terms of capital adjustment theory. Given Saudi Arabia's histor-
ical factor price ratios (i.e., the relative price of capital and labor), producers 
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became accustomed to certain techniques of production. After 1973, the 
relative cheapening of capital and the growing cost of labor dictated a greater 
amotint of capital per unit of labor. Clearly, the transition to this new 
productive structure could not be instantaneous. It requires considerable time 
to adjust prevailing production techniques to the new factor price ratio, even in 
highly industrialized economies with well-functioning capital markets. 
The importance of learning effects associated with the investment process 
are becoming apparent. Clearly, the kingdom's current difficulties in absorb-
ing greater amounts of capital must be partially attributed to the relatively low 
rate of past (pre-1973) investment. Higher historical rates would have most 
likely provided not only greater familiarity and practice in the investment 
process, but perhaps more importantly, a larger economic system capable of 
providing a greater volume of productive investment opportunities than cur-
rently exists. 
Based on Saudi Arabia's rudimentary financial institutions, the relative 
inexperience of most indigenous entrepreneurs with capital-intensive tech-
niques, and the historic isolation of the kingdom from the sources of tech-
nology, the process of adjustment will take a long time to complete. 
To a certain extent, many of the bottlenecks associated with the kingdom's 
current economic expansion have been alleviated through the government's 
judicious use of foreign workers and managers. Still, it is unlikely that the 
fundamental problem of capital absorption will be resolved until well into the 
fourth plan period (1985-1990). 
Despite the country's limited absorptive capacity, higher oil revenues have 
exerted considerable political pressures on the respective ministries to in-
crease their investment expenditures. 
To test for any possible structural shifts in government expenditures stem-
ming from the 1973 oil price increases, several dummy variables were 
included in the regressions of oil revenues on government investment and total 
government allocations. Four dummies were constructed: 
1. DUMl, with values of 0 for 1960-1972, and 1 for 1973-1979 
2. DUM2, with values ofO for 1960-1973, and 1for1974-1979 
3. DUM3, with values ofO for 1960-1974, and 1for1975-1979 
4. DUM4, with values ofOfor 1960-1975, and 1for1976-1979 
The dummy variables were then introduced, one by one, into the general 
equation: 17 
GEXP=z+(bl)OILREV+(b2)DUM 
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where DUM = (Dn) (OILREV), with GEXP= government expenditures in con-
stant 1970 prices (investment total): O/LREV=government oil revenues (de-
flated with world prices of industrial goods, 1970= 1.0), and DUM=the 
dummy variables with n = 1-4. 
The results (Table 3.3) for each of the class of government expenditures 
show a similar and striking pattern-dummies 1, 2, and 3 resulted in identical 
nonsignificant results (therefore only DUM4 is significant in most cases). 18 
One might have expected the government to have adjusted its expenditures 
earlier to the oil price increases oflate 1973. However, 1975-76 is mislead-
ing, since the figures used were based on the Saudi calendar year ending June 
30. Presumably if the data were based on the Gregorian calendar year, a 
greater increase in government expenditures would have been recorded in 
1974, 1975, and 1976. 
Oil Revenue Impact on Macroeconomic Variables 
Regressions (Table 3 .3) of oil revenues on real government investment, 
government consumption, and total government expenditures (consumption 
plus investment) show, in fact, that current period revenues have only a minor 
impact on government expenditure patterns. The best results were obtained 
using a Koyck distributed lag scheme (equations 3, 12, and 21) with a dummy 
variable (DUM4 values of zero for 1960-1975, one for 1976-1978). 
As with government expenditures, current period oil revenues have only a 
minor impact on each of the major macroeconomic aggregates (Tables 
3.4-3.7). In terms of real non-oil GDP, a Koyck lag pattern (equation 7) 
provides the best results, although the coefficient for oil revenues (0.04) is 
quite small (as was the case in the other regressions). The impact of oil 
revenues on real private consumption was best estimated with a two-period lag 
scheme (Table 3.5, equation 8), indicating a considerable period of adjust-
ment of consumption patterns to increased exports. In contrast to the other 
macroeconomic aggregates, imports are significantly affected by current 
period oil revenues {Table 3.6, equation 1), although a two-period oil revenue 
lag scheme (equation 8) seems to give the best statistical results. 
Private investment is also fairly responsive to current period oil revenues 
(Table 3.7, equation 1). However, a Koyck distributed lag scheme provides 
better results (Table 3.7, equation 3). Though sometimes positive, the ten-
dency for lagged private investment to assume a negative sign in a number of 
regressions may indicate an inability of private investors to keep up with the 
expansion in exports. 
Though current period oil revenues affect the determinants of investment, 
the lagged versions provide better results. This implies that expansion of 
current exports is not necessary for the growth of capital. It also indicates that 
Table 3.3 
SAUDI ARABIA: DETERMINANTS OF GOVERNMENT EXPENDITURE, 1960-1978 
(constant 1970 prices) 
Independent Variables 
Lagged Lagged Expenditure 
Dependent Government Oil Oil Lagged 
Variable Equation Expenditure Revenue Revenue Twice DUM4 RHOa Intercept r2 b F" DWd 
Total Government (1) 0.20 0.27 0.18 2599.80 
Expenditure (2.85) (2.88) (0.77) (2.20) 0.873 49.73 1.25 
(2) 0.03 0.97 63699.9 
(0.24) (16.52) (2.46) 0.004 0.06 0.45 
(3) 0.84 0.21 -0.67 146.03 
(21.32) (14.84) •(-3.67) (1.37) 0.999 7385.08 2.07 
(4) 1.12 0.10 -0.60 -417.89 
(18.45) (5.23) (-3.05) (-1.80) 0.995 1277.43 1.89 
(5) 0.85 0.01 0.19 -0.72 102.85 
(20.66) (0.89) (7.91) (-4.35) (0.89) 0.999 4719.13 2.08 
(6) 0.90 0.07 0.04 0.06 
-
2460.2 
(22.15) (2.52) (0.58) (2.17) (2.12) 0.999 5498.13 1.80 
Government (7) 0.06 0.97 41505.1 
investment (0.90) (18.02) (2.28) 0.048 0.807 0.45 
(8) 0.03 0.17 -0.06 700.66 
(0.91) (4.60) (-0.25) (1.33) 0.866 45.44 1.43 
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(9) 0.97 0.09 -0.63 -267.79 
(10.85) (7.43) (-3.32) (-2.36) 0.992 817.99 1.76 
(10) 0.87 0.003 0.006 
-
87.68 
(26.98) (4.54) (9.65) (1.72) 0.999 1460.98 1.71 
(11) 1.28 0.04 0.57 -320.69 
(11.14) (3.03) (-2.83) (-1.55) 0.974 262.56 2.10 
(12) 0.88 0.01 0.08 
-
141.08 
(25.80) (3.87) (16.31) (2.83) 0.999 3479.45 1.81 
(13) 0.81 -0.06 0.17 -0.68 -119.53 
(18.56) (-7.68) (14.10) (-3.86) (-2.30) 0.998 2732.54 1.81 
(14) 0.85 -0.03 0.01 0.04 - -1.57 
(21.69) (-1.85) (2.76) (2.33) (-0.03) 0.999 3299.86 I.SS 
(15) 1.73 0.05 -1.04 
-
-37.24 
(8.10) (4.32) (-2.44) (-0.18) 0.984 257.59 2.50 
(16) 0.42 -0.01 0.88 0.11 88.65 
(7.21) (-1.36) (13.28) (17.50) 
- (0.53) 0.995 417.19 1.64 
Government (17) 0.08 0.97 28006.9 
consumption (1.87) (16.38) (2. 72) 0.180 3.50 0.52 
(18) 0.16 0.43 2088.93 
(4. 78) (2.04) (2.87) 0.868 40.07 1.09 
(19) 0.85 0.09 0.04 453.89 
(5.68) (2.78) (0.17) (1.52) 0.987 3479.45 1.81 
(20) 0.75 0.19 -0.Q7 -0.78 169.85 
(8.56) (7.02) (-4.51) (-5.21) (1.07) 0.997 1454.14 2.68 
Table 3.3 (cont.) 
SAUDI ARABIA: DETERMINANTS OF GOVERNMENT EXPENDITURE, I960-I978 
(constant 1970 prices) 
Independent Variables 
Lagged Lagged Expenditure 
Dependent Government Oil Oil Lagged 
Variable Equation Expenditure Revenue Revenue Twice DUM4 RHOa Intercept r2 b pc DWd 
Government (21) 0.92 O.o? -0.71 132.38 
investment (32.87) (13.96) (-4.19) (2.14) 0.999 7787.77 2.41 
(22) 0.89 0.07 0.01 -0.69 173.79 
(18.22) (9.58) (0.67) (-3.99) (l.95) 0.999 4515.14 2.48 
(23) 0.94 0.09 -0.05 0.02 -0.84 191.35 
(16.70) (5.74) (-1.07) (1.32) (-6.40) (2.29) 0.999 4319.27 2.36 
(24) 0.64 0.08 0.25 • -0.64 243.08 
(2.67) (9.26) (1.02) (-3.32) (2.34) 0.999 2384.11 2.19 
NoTE: Equations were estimated in linear form, Y=a +bl XI +b2X2, where Y=dependent variable, X refers to the independent variables, a is the intercept, 
and bis the independent variable coefficient. Figures within the parentheses contain the t statistic. 
a. RHO is a term created by the Cochrane-Orcutt estimation procedure to eliminate first-order serial correlation in the estimated variables. 
b. ,l is a measure of the goodness-of-fit. 
c. Fis a statistic measuring the significance of the regression equation. 
d. DW is the Durban-Watson statistic (see Hall and Hall, "Time Series Processor," pp. 22-24. 
Table 3.4 
SAUDI ARABIA: IMPACT OF OIL REVENUES ON NON-OIL GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCT, I 960- I 978 
(constant 1970 prices) 
Independent Variables 
Lagged Lagged Non-oil GDP 
Dependent Non-oil Oil Oil Lagged 
Variable Equation GDP Revenues Revenues Twice DUM4 RHO Intercept r2 F DW 
Non-oil gross (1) 0.05 0.04 0.96 3119.86 
domestic product (1.68) (1.86) (14.58) (4.70) 0.320 3.29 0.51 
(2) O.G2 
(1.43) 0.114 2.06 1.23 
(3) 1.12 0.01 0.17 -130.52 
(19.64) (0.83) (0.74) (-0.37) 0.996 1656.49 1.85 
(4) 1.01 0.09 -0.85 123.88 
(29.64) (5.22) (-6.58) (0.73) 0.999 5632.50 1.97 
(5) 1.06 0.04 -0.02 0.56 84.14 
(44.99) (6.15) (-2.21) (-2.77) (0.64) 0.999 7617.40 2.30 
(6) 1.04 0.03 0.02 -0.02 -0.46 127.34 
(37.56) (3.09) (0.79) (-1.56) (-2.13) (0.93) 0.999 6052.32 2.20 
(7) 1.05 0.04 -0.Ql -0.51 93.65 
(49.13) (6.91) (-2.60) (-2.42) (0.76) 0.999 8142.97 2.29 
(8) 0.75 0.04 0.31 -0.20 230.97 
(2.78) (4.25) (1.06) (-0.83) (1.32) 0.999 4054.05 2.04 
(9) 1.24 0.03 -0.Q3 -0.01 -0.55 87.08 
(3.48) (3.65) (-0.55) (-2.20) (-2.62) (0.58) 0.999 4076.76 2.45 
Table 3.5 
SAUDI ARABIA: IMPACT OF OIL REVENUES ON PRIVATE CONSUMPTION, I960-I978 
(constant 1970 prices) 
Independent Variables 
Lagged Lagged Private 
Dependent Private Oil Oil Consumption 
Variable Equation Consumption Revenues Revenues Lagged Twice DUM4 RHO Intercept r2 F DW 
Private consumption (1) 0.14 O.Q7 0.10 3808.02 
(2.58) (l.31) (0.45) (4.36) 0. 7265 18.60 1.33 
(2) 1.11 0.06 -0.41 -454.81 
(3.86) (1.35) (-1.83) (-0.41) 0.944 118.30 2.05 
(3) 0.99 0.26 -0.17 0.34 -900.73 
(2.15) (2.56) (-3.07) (1.51) (-0.49) 0.892 33.10 1.81 
(4) 1.34 0.02 -0.26 -1328.71 
(5.62) (0.67) • (-1.12) (-1.40) 0.930 793.29 1.77 
(5) 2.17 0.14 -0.16 0.85 -7289.45 
(6.69) (3.42) (-4.61) (6.73) (-2.01) 0. 794 15.41 1.46 
(6) 1.21 O.Q2 0.21 -0.24 1634.30 
(2.52) (0.57) (0.38) (-0.85) (-1.36) 0.924 48.79 1.71 
(7) 2.28 0.13 0.77 -0.18 0.93 -1759.66 
(7.40) (3.25) (2.70) (-6.02) (10.17) (-2.57) 0.851 11.37 1.33 
(8) 1.10 -0.02 0.08 -0.43 -408.84 
(3.81) (-0.36) (1.17) (-1.96) (-0.36) 0.946 69.96 2.16 
(9) 0.78 -0.13 0.43 -0.18 -0.49 118.75 
(2.28) (-2.05) (2.64) (-2.29) (-2.36) (0.12) 0. 953 81.80 2.30 
Table 3.6 
SAUDI ARABIA: IMPACT OF OIL REVENUES ON IMPORTS, 1960-I 978 
(constant 1970 prices) 
Independent Variables 
Lagged Imports 
Lagged Oil Oil Lagged 
Equation Imports Revenues Revenues Twice DUM4 RHO Intercept r2 F DW 
Imports (1) 0.36 0.23 0.45 
(4.55) (2.82) (2.24) 
-
0.856 95.15 1.03 
(2) 1.12 0.11 -0,07 -471.96 
(23.03) (5.92) (-0.31) (-1.88) 0.996 1590.13 2.00 
(3) 1.03 0.11 0.04 -0.23 -158.85 
(17.41) (6.32) (1.79) (-0.95) (-0.60) 0.997 1352.49 1.89 
(4) 0.91 0.20 0.01 73.69 
(10.94) (5.69) (0.05) (0.26) 0.995 1449.53 1.95 
(5) 0.88 0.26 -0.05 -0.13 -170.28 
(11.94) (6.20) (-1.92) (-0.56) (-0.63) 0.997 1282.11 2.06 
(6) 1.53 0.10 -0.60 -0.79 -60.20 
(13.28) (8.47) (-4.04) (-5.21) (-0.37) 0.999 3435.21 1.95 
(7) 1.59 0.10 -0.67 -0.008 -0.80 -89.81 
(6.75) (7.81) (-2.65) (-0.32) (-5.27) (-0.46) 0.999 1739.97 1.98 
(8) 0.95 0.05 0.15 -0,02 0.01 -241.36 
(13.15) (2.14) (2.46) (-0.73) (0.05) (-0.91) 0.997 1064.37 1.99 
Table3.7 
SAUDI ARABIA: IMPACT OF OIL REVENUES ON PRIVATE INVESTMENT, Ig6o-I978 
(constant 1970 prices) 
Independent Variables 
Private 
Lagged Lagged Investment 
Dependent Private Oil Oil Lagged 
Variable Equation Investment Revenues Revenues Twice DUM4 RHO Intercept ,,. F DW 
Private (1) 0.18 0.44 
investment (13.53) (2.14) 0.915 183.23 1.62 
(2) 0.18 -0.009 0.46 
(9.38) (-0.45) (2.23) 0.911 164.58 1.56 
. 
(3) 0.39 0.10 -0.66 482.52 
(2.74) (6.03) (-3.59) (3.02) 0.984 451.15 2.28 
(4) 0.84 0.08 -1.35 -0.74 -18.16 
(2.33) (3.42) (-1.35) (-4.50) (-0.05) 0.988 317.97 2.35 
(5) -0.04 0.10 0.06 
(-0.07) (5.22) (0.79) 
(6) -0.95 O.Q7 0.30 -0.07 0.33 1295.20 
(-3.05) (3.35) (4.61) (-3.40) (1.45) (3.31) 0.965 81.78 1.58 
(7) -O.Q7 0.12 0.39 -0.86 508.89 
(-0.28) (6.92) (2.12) (-6.85) (3.55) 0.990 404.96 2.37 
(8) ·0.61 0.09 0.51 -0.06 -0.59 -419.42 
(2.29) (4.98) (3.22) (-2.75) (-2.93) (-1.22) 0.992 253.69 2.19 
(9) -1.62 0.38 0.28 2487.42 
(-3.44) (5.56) (1.19) (4.64) 0.885 53.96 1.74 
(10) -1.24 0.44 -0.10 -0.04 1546.16 
(-2.89) (6.81) (-0.26) (-0.16) (3.56) 0.965 110.16 2.01 
58 I Impact of Petroleum Exports 
the country may have enough reserves to finance its current investment needs. 
Thus, short-run fluctuations in export earnings need not impair the country's 
development plans. 
The coefficients for oil revenues are quite small in all of the macroeconomic 
regressions. They are considerably smaller, however, in the sectoral regres-
sions. Construction is the only sector where current period oil revenues have a 
possibility of affecting production, but even here the result is not very 
significant (Table 3.8, equation 5). 
Oil Revenue Impact on Sectoral Output 
The responsiveness of the economy's seven major sectors to changes in oil 
revenues was examined. (The results of this study are available from the 
author on request.) It is expected that the growth in oil revenues would 
stimulate the output of these sectors, through backward, forward, and final 
demand linkages, as well as through the less direct spread effects. 19 
In general, sectoral output is best estimated with a lagged sector/lagged oil 
revenue equation-agriculture, manufacturing, trade, and electricity. Koyck 
distributed lag schemes were best in estimating construction, transport and 
communications, and public administration and defense. The results imply a 
positive but weak spread effect, with construction clearly the sector most 
affected by the oil boom. 
Several factors are undoubtedly responsible for the lack of a strong direct 
association between expenditure and sectoral output and exports. The steady 
upward rise in exports has forced ARAMCO and other oil-related companies 
to pay continually higher wages. As a result, other government and many 
larger private sector companies have come under constant pressure to raise 
wages and reduce the pay differentials between themselves and the petroleum 
sector. Therefore, domestic labor costs have recently tended to be quite high 
by international standards. In addition, the country's abundant foreign ex-
change (dollar) supplies, combined with domestic inflationary pressures, have 
resulted in an overvalued Saudi rial. Imports are thus cheap, whereas exports 
other than oil are difficult to develop. Manufacturing has, therefore, expanded 
relatively slowly around a small base of import-substitution industries, local 
industries producing goods domestically that were formerly imported-e.g., 
many of the local industries springing up in the Eastern Province to supply 
ARAMCO. 
The Saudi government has exercised considerable discretion in the timing 
of its expenditures and has assembled a large foreign financial portfolio in 
recent years. One would thus expect the relationship between sectoral output 
and government expenditures (in terms of total government expenditures and 
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RobertE. Looney I 61 
does not appear to be the case. In nearly all cases (Table 3.8), regressions 
using government expenditures gave poorer statistical results (in terms of 
r
2 
and F) than comparable tests using oil revenues. (These results are avail-
able from the author on request.) In no case was there any significant improve-
ment using government expenditures. The same is true for the major 
macroeconomic variables including non-oil GDP (see Table 3.9). 
One explanation for the observed results involves the compositional pattern 
of government expenditures. Although the government has proceeded with a 
series of massive infrastructural projects, a larger increase has taken place in 
its exj>enditures on social, military, and administrative services. Like most 
governments, the authorities in Riyadh have been tempted to spend their 
revenues on projects that produce immediate results-that is, on public 
building projects and housing projects, rather than on infrastructure directly 
supporting final producing units or indirectly productive investments in 
factories. 
The pattern of government spending leads to rapid expansion of imports 
and service activities, with little impact either on the sectoral output or the 
productive capacity of the economy. Given the country's limited range of 
advantages, this strategy may have been the best of the options open to the 
government. This also explains the positive but low spread effects associated 
with the sectoral patterns of growth. 
In general, these results indicate that current exports are not important in 
determining output, but do create positive (albeit small) spread effects. In 
short, there is considerable evidence that spread effects are important and that 
the investment opportunities generated by the oil revenues are being exploited 
to advantage. 
The regressions also indicate weak direct linkages, meaning that most of 
the sectoral output will grow independently of the expansion of exports. In the 
case of manufacturing, this indicates that output largely involves import 
substitution and responds to the general level of domestic demand. It may also 
indicate that the expansion in oil exports is not fully exploited in stimulating 
manufacturing output. In other words, the country is having difficulty max-
imizing the rate of growth of its only logical alternative (if it is to lessen its 
dependence on oil). The problem here may be simply one of insufficient 
market size. 
Conclusion 
We may ask whether the conclusions prove that Saudi Arabia's oil revenues 
have created numerous incentives for the non-oil sector, and whether that 
sector has generated spread and linkage effects through the economy. As is 
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of the sort presented here can never prove a hypothesis correct. As such, these 
results do not support the idea that the Saudi Arabian petroleum sector has had 
only a short-run, transitory impact in stimulating the domestic economy. The 
results also show that the country's entrepreneurs have not taken advantage of 
some of the investment possibilities made available by the revenues generated 
by the petroleum sector. In general, changes in the level of exports impact the 
non-oil sector of the economy, but take time to produce their full effect. The 
precise nature of these mechanisms varies from sector to sector and by the type 
of expenditure. No doubt, further testing is needed before a definitive state-
ment can be made. 
It is clear, however, that the principal characteristics of Saudi Arabian 
development are not simply a consequence of the petroleum industry. Rather, 
they result from the economic policies pursued by the government in an 
environment heavily influenced by the existence of the petroleum industry. In 
other words, the current and future role of the petroleum industry in Saudi 
development is in large measure a consequence of government policies and 
sociocultural conditions. 
The results also suggest that the investment is made primarily in industries 
whose output does not depend on a steady infusion of oil revenues to sustain 
demand (e.g., investment to build the infrastructure and to produce import 
substitutes for which demand is readily available). Moreover, some of the 
country's investments may require a long development period, such as those 
projects undertaken at Jubail in petrochemicals, steel, and other heavy indus-
tries. There is also the possibility that some imported capital goods may not be 
fully utilized due to domestic market limitations. The expansion in exports 
neither provides adequate sales volume nor creates enough demand to justify 
the economic establishment of many manufacturing industries. 
Notes 
1. An excellent fonnal model of these relationships is given in E. E. Hagen, "Eco-
nomic Growth with Unlimited Foreign Exchange and No Technical Progress," in Jagdish 
Bhaghwati and Richard Eckaus, eds., Development and Planning (London: George Allen 
& Unwin, 1972), pp. 69-78. 
2. Unless otherwise specified, all data on the economy are from Saudi Arabian 
Monetary Agency, Annual Report, various issues. 
3. Jean Paul Cleron, Saudi Arabia2()()() (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1978), p. 24. 
4. Cf. Donald Wells, "Aramco: The Evolution of an Oil Concession," in Raymond F. 
Mikesell, ed., Foreign Investment in the Petroleum and Mineral Industries (Baltimore: 
Johns Hopkins Press, 1971), pp. 216-36. 
64 I Impact of Petroleum Exports 
5. Ahmad Kader, "The Contribution of Oil Exports to Economic Development: 
A Study of the Major Oil Exporting Countries," The American Economist, Spring 1980, 
p. 46. 
6. William Harris, "The Impact of the Petroleum Export Industries on the Pattern of 
Venezuelan Economic Development," in Mikesell, Foreign Investment, p. 130. 
7. As an example of this approach, see William Bartsch, "The Impact of the Oil 
Industry on the Economy oflran," in Mikesell, Foreign Investment, pp. 237-63. 
8. Not shown here, but found in Ministry of Planning, The Second Development Plan, 
1975-1980(Riyadh: Ministry of Planning, 1976) and Third Development Plan, 1400-1405 
A.H. (Riyadh: Ministry of Planning, 1980). 
9. John S. Birks and Charles A. Sinclair, Arab Manpower (London: Croom Helm, 
1980), p. 107. 
10. Cf. the Hagen and Kader articles cited in notes 1 and 5 for approaches along these 
lines. 
11. See Robert Looney, Saudi Arabia's Development Potential (Lexington, Mass.: 
Lexington Books, 1982), chaps. 6 and 12, for an elaboration of these points. 
12. In particular, see Robert S. Pindyck and Daniel Robinfeld, Econometric Models 
and Economic Forecasts, 2nd ed. (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1981), chap. 9. 
13. For a detailed explanation of the theory of distributed lags, together with an outline 
of operational estimating procedures, see Ziv Griliches, "Distributed Lags: A Survey," 
Econometrica, January 1967, pp. 15-49. 
14. Cf. Leon M. Koyck, Distributed Lags and lnvestment Analysis (Amsterdam: North 
Holland, 1954). 
15. Potluri Rao and Rodger Miller, Applied Econometrics (Belmont, Calif.: 
Wadsworth, 1971), chap. 7. 
16. See, for example, Brunko Horvat, "The Optimum Rate of Investment," The 
Economic Journal, December 1958; Raymond F. Mikesell, ed., U.S. Private and Govern-
ment Investment Abroad (Eugene, Ore.: University of Oregon Books, 1962); and John 
Adler, Absorptive Capacity: The Concept and Its Determinants (Washington, D.C.: The 
Brookings Institution, 1965). 
17. Formulations along these lines have also been attempted by Ragaei El Mallakh and 
Mihssen Kadhim, "Absorptive Capacity, Surplus Finds, and Regional Capital Mobility in 
the Middle East," Rivista Intemazionale di Scienze Economiche e Commerciali, April 
1977, pp. 308-25. Because the time period for their study ends in 1974, their results are not 
nearly as striking as the ones presented below. 
18. All of the empirical results that follow were obtained through ordinary least squares 
regression estimates using the TSP statistical program. First-order serial correlation was 
corrected for by using a two-stage iteration Cochrane-Orcutt technique. The method 
estimates ROW from ordinary least squares residuals, transforms the dependent and 
independent variables so that the residuals from the transformed equation will be roughly 
serially uncorrelated, and then runs a regression using the transformed variables. Cf. 
Bronwyn Hall and Robert Hall, "Time Series Processor, Version 3.5 User's Manual," 
mimeographed (Stanford, Calif., April 6, 1980), pp. 22-23. 
19. A discussion of these points is given in Michael Metwally and Hans V. Tamaschke, 
"Oil Exports and Growth in the Middle East," Kyklos, 1980, pp. 499-522. 
-":·-:P,}Y~. 
~·,>~;C • 
